英语翻译1.Being Asked to Soften the Urgency of the O-ring Proble

英语翻译
1.Being Asked to Soften the Urgency of the O-ring Problem
My notebook entry on August 15,1985,reads as follows:"An attempt to form the team (referring to the Solid Rocket Motor seal erosion team) was made on 19 July 1985.This attempt virtually failed and resulted in my writing memo 2870:FY86:073.This memo finally got some response and a team was formed officially.The first meeting was held on August 15,1985 at 2:30 pm." The memo referred to is the one I read to the Presidential Commission on February 25,1986,which was written to the vice president of engineering at Morton Thiokol on July 31,1985.The memo ended by saying,"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to dedicate a team to solve the problem,with the field joint having the number one priority,then we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad facilities."
During this July period,NASA headquarters in Washington D.C.asked Morton Thiokol to prepare a presentation on the problems with all the booster seals.The presentation was prepared by MSFC on August 19,1985,with Morton Thiokol personnel in attendance.
Morton Thiokol was then asked by MSFC in September to send a representative to the SAE conference in October to discuss the seals and solicit help from the experts.I prepared and presented a six-page overview of the joints and the seal configuration to approximately 130 technical experts on October 7,1985.However,I was given strict instructions,which came from NASA,not to express the critical urgency of fixing the joint but only to emphasize the joint improvement aspect during my presentation
2Frustration with Lack of Management Support
After my presentation,I asked for help in the form of design improvement suggestions,but no one said a word.Bob Ebeling and I spent the remainder of the convention time meeting with seal vendors whom we had previously contacted for help.From the beginning,the Seal Task Team was frustrated from a lack of management support to provide the resources necessary for us to accomplish our task.
3Temperature Forecast for Challenger Flight
Accordingly,I wrote a series of very damning activity reports in which I left no room for error about how I felt concerning the lack of management support.Unfortunately,I never received any comments back and never knew if they had been incorporated into reports up through the management structure.
The evening meeting of January 27,1986,was the concluding event preceding the launch disaster.The major activity that day focused upon the predicted 18 degrees Fahrenheit overnight temperature

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1.Being Asked to Soften the Urgency of the O-ring Problem
My notebook entry on August 15,1985,reads as follows:"An attempt to form the team (referring to the Solid Rocket Motor seal erosion team) was made on 19 July 1985.This attempt virtually failed and resulted in my writing memo 2870:FY86:073.This memo finally got some response and a team was formed officially.The first meeting was held on August 15,1985 at 2:30 pm." The memo referred to is the one I read to the Presidential Commission on February 25,1986,which was written to the vice president of engineering at Morton Thiokol on July 31,1985.The memo ended by saying,"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to dedicate a team to solve the problem,with the field joint having the number one priority,then we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad facilities."
During this July period,NASA headquarters in Washington D.C.asked Morton Thiokol to prepare a presentation on the problems with all the booster seals.The presentation was prepared by MSFC on August 19,1985,with Morton Thiokol personnel in attendance.
Morton Thiokol was then asked by MSFC in September to send a representative to the SAE conference in October to discuss the seals and solicit help from the experts.I prepared and presented a six-page overview of the joints and the seal configuration to approximately 130 technical experts on October 7,1985.However,I was given strict instructions,which came from NASA,not to express the critical urgency of fixing the joint but only to emphasize the joint improvement aspect during my presentation
1.被敦促要削弱圆形密封环问题的紧迫性
在1985年8月15日,我在记事本上是这样写的：“在1985年7月19日,试图成立一个小组（这是指实体火箭发动机密封环侵蚀处理小组）,由于没有成功才造成我编写备忘录编号2870:FY86:073.该备忘录最终获得反馈,正式成立一个小组,并于1985年8月15日召开第一次会议.”这个备忘录是1985年7月31日写给Morton Thiokol公司的工程部副总裁,而且于1986年2月25日向总统委员会宣读.备忘录的结尾是这样写的：“如果我们不即刻委派一个小组去解决这个问题,并将现场接点作为优先处理,我确实害怕我们将有危险失去一次航行并连带损失发射台的所有设施.”
同年7月期间,在华盛顿的美国国家航空航天局总部要求Morton Thiokol公司准备一份有关助推器密封环问题的说明演示.在Morton Thiokol公司人员的参与下,该说明于1985年8月19日由马歇尔航天中心（MSFC）完成.
随后在9月,马歇尔航天中心要求Morton Thiokol公司委派一位代表参加在10月举行的汽车工程师学会
（SAE）会议,讨论有关密封环问题及向专家求助.1985年10月7日,我向大约130位技术专家发表了一份涉及接头与密封环结构的六页概述； 不过,美国国家航空航天局向我发出严格的指令,只要我强调改善接头方面事宜而不要表达解决接头问题的极度紧迫性.
2．Frustration with Lack of Management Support
After my presentation,I asked for help in the form of design improvement suggestions,but no one said a word.Bob Ebeling and I spent the remainder of the convention time meeting with seal vendors whom we had previously contacted for help.From the beginning,the Seal Task Team was frustrated from a lack of management support to provide the resources necessary for us to accomplish our task.
2.得不到管理层支持的沮丧
说明演示后,我向专家求助关于设计改良的建议,但是无人吭声.所以我和Bob Ebeling利用剩下的会议时间,与那些以前联系过的密封环供应商会面.从一开始,密封环工作小组就没有得到管理层支持提供我们完成任务所需的资源,这使我们感到沮丧.
3．Temperature Forecast for Challenger Flight
Accordingly,I wrote a series of very damning activity reports in which I left no room for error about how I felt concerning the lack of management support.Unfortunately,I never received any comments back and never knew if they had been incorporated into reports up through the management structure.
The evening meeting of January 27,1986,was the concluding event preceding the launch disaster.The major activity that day focused upon the predicted 18 degrees Fahrenheit overnight temperature
3.挑战者航行的温度预测
因此,我写了一系列的充满谴责的活动报告,很明确地表达我对缺乏管理层支持的感受.很不幸,我从来没有收过任何回复意见,也不知我的报告是否被转达给上层管理结构.1986年1月27日傍晚的会议是发射事故前的最后一次场合；当天的主要行动是关注所预测的华氏18°通夜温度.