大师作文网请翻译一下这段摘自金融杂志的英文,谢谢（拒绝机器翻译）
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请翻译一下这段摘自金融杂志的英文,谢谢（拒绝机器翻译）
The above result requires the ability to solve for the blockholder’s optimal
trading volume upon information, as this determines how much information
she will acquire. The Kyle (1985) model requires both normal liquidity trader
demand and normal firm value to derive informed trades in closed form. Most
corporate finance applications of the Kyle model use binary firm value and
thus cannot solve for trading volumes endogenously; they therefore must restrict
them to exogenous amounts that are then necessarily independent of
initial holdings. This paper makes the methodological contribution of introducing
exponential liquidity trader demand into a Kyle model to allow informed
trades to be derived in closed form when firm value is discrete. It may be of use
to future corporate finance applications of the Kyle model.
The role of blockholders in this paper differs from prior models, where they
add value through direct intervention, such as forcing a restructuring or vetoing
a pet project.3 This paper shows that blockholders can improve firm value even
if they are unable to intervene (engage in “voice”) and can only trade (engage
in “exit”). This departure from the literature is empirically motivated. Blockholders
in the U.S. rarely intervene because they are typically small4 and face
significant legal and institutional barriers.5 Existing models centered on control
have difficulty in explaining the role that such non-controlling blockholders play in corporate governance, and thus justifying why they are so prevalent.
摘自《Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency,and Managerial Myopia》
The above result requires the ability to solve for the blockholder’s optimal
trading volume upon information, as this determines how much information
she will acquire. The Kyle (1985) model requires both normal liquidity trader
demand and normal firm value to derive informed trades in closed form. Most
corporate finance applications of the Kyle model use binary firm value and
thus cannot solve for trading volumes endogenously; they therefore must restrict
them to exogenous amounts that are then necessarily independent of
initial holdings. This paper makes the methodological contribution of introducing
exponential liquidity trader demand into a Kyle model to allow informed
trades to be derived in closed form when firm value is discrete. It may be of use
to future corporate finance applications of the Kyle model.
The role of blockholders in this paper differs from prior models, where they
add value through direct intervention, such as forcing a restructuring or vetoing
a pet project.3 This paper shows that blockholders can improve firm value even
if they are unable to intervene (engage in “voice”) and can only trade (engage
in “exit”). This departure from the literature is empirically motivated. Blockholders
in the U.S. rarely intervene because they are typically small4 and face
significant legal and institutional barriers.5 Existing models centered on control
have difficulty in explaining the role that such non-controlling blockholders play in corporate governance, and thus justifying why they are so prevalent.
摘自《Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency,and Managerial Myopia》
以上的结论要求能够求出基于信息的大股东最优交易量,因为这决定着她需要多少信息.凯尔模型（1985）需要一般流动性交易者的需求以及正常的公司价值,从而获得私有信息交易.大多数采用凯尔模型的公司会采用二元公司价值（这个应该就是指实体价值和虚拟价值——十一月的雨按）,因此无法内在地求出交易量；所以他们只能依靠外生量,即必须与初始持股独立的量.本文提供了一种方法,在知道公司价值后,将流动性交易者的指数性需求引入凯尔模型,从而能够进行私有信息交易.这可能会对今后公司利用凯尔模型融资有实用意义.
本文中的大股东不同于以往的模型,在以往的模型中,大股东可以通过直接干预,比如推动重组或者否决小项目,来增加价值.本文中,大股东可以提升公司价值,尽管他们无法干预（通过“有发言权”）,并只能交易（通过“退出”）.这种同书本的背离在经验上会起到激励作用.美国的大股东很少进行干预,因为他们一般都较小,且面临着法律制度门槛.着重于控制的退出式模型很难解释这种非控制性大股东在企业管理中的角色,这证明了其如此流行的原因.
本文中的大股东不同于以往的模型,在以往的模型中,大股东可以通过直接干预,比如推动重组或者否决小项目,来增加价值.本文中,大股东可以提升公司价值,尽管他们无法干预（通过“有发言权”）,并只能交易（通过“退出”）.这种同书本的背离在经验上会起到激励作用.美国的大股东很少进行干预,因为他们一般都较小,且面临着法律制度门槛.着重于控制的退出式模型很难解释这种非控制性大股东在企业管理中的角色,这证明了其如此流行的原因.