英语翻译The literature has emphasized small banks’ advantage in

英语翻译
The literature has emphasized small banks’ advantage in accessing soft information and assumes that banks will fully utilize such information,if acquired.This is a reasonable assumption for purely profit-maximizing financial institutions.If the only goal of the bank is to maximize profits,it will provide local loan managers enough incentives to collect and use soft information.The China experience can provide a new perspective because local branches in China are often not purely profit-maximizing financial institutions if the goals of the headquarters are not purely profit-maximization.Further the local government may influence loan decision making.The degree of law enforcement can be another important factor because weak law enforcement means higher default risk to enterprises.Therefore,whether local branches can access soft information is one thing,and whether local banks are willing to fully utilize such information is another.
In this paper,we aim to study how bank size in conventional measurement,soft information importance,competition and institutional arrangements affects SME lending in China.Following the literature we measure the bank size by total bank assets,and our first hypothesis is if bank size reflects the bank’s ability to collect soft information,smaller bank size is not a necessary condition for greater SME lending in China.As not all financial institutions are purely profit-maximizing institutions,the local branches’ attitude toward soft information may depend on how much authority they have over funds,the incentive structure,competition and institutional arrangements.Our paper makes the following contribution to the literature.We are studying the relationship between bank size and SME lending under the context that the banks may not be purely profit-maximization financial institutions.In particular,our data provide the upper branches’ weight on profit in performance evaluation to allow for the possibility that local branches are partly profit-maximizing institutions.The second contribution is we study under what conditions soft information can lead to more SME lending.We find that when local branches have more authority over funds,when local bank governor’s wage is linked with loan quality,and when banks are pushed to control cost,they have more incentive to use soft information.Further,we closely study how competition and institutional arrangements affect SME lending.

文献强调在获取软信息'小银行的优势,假定银行将充分利用这些信息,如果收购.这是一个纯粹追求利润最大化的金融机构合理的假设.如果该银行的唯一目标是利润最大化,它会提供足够的诱因本地贷款管理,收集和利用软信息.在中国的经验可以提供一个新的视角,因为在中国的分支机构往往不是单纯追求利润最大化的金融机构如果总部的目标不是单纯的利润最大化.此外,当地政府可能会影响贷款决策.执法的程度也可以是另一个重要的因素,因为执法不力意味着更高的违约风险的企业.因此,无论是当地分支机构可以访问软信息是一回事,是否本地银行愿意充分利用这些资料是另一回事.
在本文中,我们的目标是研究如何在传统的银行规模测量,软信息的重要性,竞争和体制安排,中国中小企业贷款的影响.继文学,我们衡量银行按总资产规模的银行,和我们的第一个假设是,如果银行的大小反映了银行的软信息搜集能力,较小的银行规模是不是更大的中小企业在中国贷款的必要条件.由于并非所有的金融机构纯粹是利润最大化的机构,由当地分行对软信息的态度可能取决于有多少权力,他们对资金的激励机制,竞争和体制安排.文件使我们对文学以下贡献.我们正在研究的背景下的银行规模和中小企业之间的借贷关系,银行可能不单纯是利润最大化的金融机构.特别是,我们的数据提供的上分行的利润在绩效评估权重,以便有可能是部分地方分支机构利润最大化的机构.第二个贡献是我们研究在什么条件下软信息可以导致更多的中小企业贷款.我们发现,当有更多的本地分行在资金,在当地银行行长的工资是贷款质量联系在一起,当银行被推到控制成本的权威,他们有更多的诱因,利用软信息.此外,我们密切研究如何竞争和体制安排,影响中小企业的贷款.