会计方面的英文翻译CorSecondly, while the relationship-based financial

会计方面的英文翻译
CorSecondly, while the
relationship-based financial system in East Asia worked well during the boom period since outside
investors did not have full information on whether or not their funds were being deployed
1

appropriately, the crisis triggered greater investor awareness of weaknesses in corporate
governance in the region and led to them pulling-out (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Consistent with
these arguments, Mitton (2002) finds that firms with higher disclosure quality, greater
transparency, higher outside ownership concentration, and corporate focus experienced better
stock price performance during the crisis. Lemmon and Lins (2001) also show that during the
crisis, firms in which controlling owner-managers owned more of the control rights, but fewer
cash flow rights, suffered more loss of share values.
In this study, we test the view of Mitton (2002) that firm-specific measures of corporate
governance affect firm performance during a crisis, looking only at Korean companies. Focusing
on a single nation in this way allows us to examine corporate governance measures at a level of
detail that would be hard to aggregate across countries.
Korean data have a number of other characteristics that make them particularly suited to our
investigation. From our perspective, one notable feature of the chaebol is that ownership is heavily
concentrated, inasmuch as one individual has almost complete control over all firms within the
group. Such a structure gives the owner-managers involved strong incentives to diversify their
wealth and human capital (Amihud and Lev, 1981), and to expand their chaebol into several
different industries. Despite the significant contribution chaebols have made to the rapid growth of
the Korean economy during the last 40 years, the criticism has been made that much of their
business expansion has resulted from excessive borrowing and that owner-managers have
expropriated other investors by investing the firm’s resources to maximize their own or the
group’s welfare (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002). Given that the Korean financial crisis in 1997 led to
a loss of investor confidence and the fall in expected returns on investment led to increased
expropriation by controlling shareholders (JBBF, 2000), it will be interesting to see whether or not
2

the tendency towards concentration of ownership in chaebol firms has an adverse effect on firm
value during the crisis period.
Furthermore, as shown in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), controlling shareholders of
chaebols have power over firms that exceeds their cash flow rights. This discrepancy in cash flow
rights and voting rights can create severe agency problems between controlling and minority
shareholders, since it gives the former group substantial power over important strategic decisions
while enabling them to avoid the full cost of any negative outcomes.

CorSecondly,而基于关系的财政系统在东亚很好运作在景气期间,因为外部投资者没有全部信息是否他们的资金适当地部署,弱点的危机被触发的更加巨大的投资者了悟在公司管理方法在这个区域和导致他们拉扯(Rajan和Zingales 1998).一致与这些论据,Mitton (2002)在危机期间,发现企业以更高的透露质量、更加伟大的透明度、更高的外部归属集中和公司焦点有经验的更好的股票价格表现.Lemmon和Lins (2001)也表示,在危机期间,中控制所有者经理拥有的企业在更多控制纠正,但少量现金流动权利,遭受了份额价值更多损失.在这项研究,我们测试在危机期间,公司管理方法牢固具体措施影响牢固的表现Mitton的看法(2002),仅注视着韩国公司.集中于一个国家这样允许我们审查公司管理方法措施在是坚硬横跨国家聚集的详细程度.韩国数据有做他们特别适合对我们的调查的一定数量的其他特征.从我们的透视,chaebol的一个显着的特点是沉重集中归属,由于一个个体在小组之内有几乎全面控制过度所有企业.这样结构给所有者经理介入热忱多样化他们的财富和人力资本(Amihud和Lev 1981)和扩展他们的chaebol入几不同的产业.尽管重大摊缴chaebols做了对韩国经济的迅速增长在最近40年期间,批评被做他们的经济高涨起因于过份借款,并且所有者经理通过投资公司的资源最大化他们自己或小组的福利征用了其他投资者(Bae、Kang和金2002).假设韩国金融危机在1997导致了投资者信心损失,并且在期望的回收投资的秋天导致了增加的征用土地由控股股东(JBBF 2000),看是否将是有趣的 倾向往归属的集中在chaebol企业中有一种不利影响在牢固的价值在危机期间.此外,如Claessens、Djankov和Lang所显示(2000),chaebols控股股东有超出他们的现金流动权利的力量在企业.这差误在现金流动权利和选举权可能制造严厉代办处问题在控制和少数股东之间,因为它做出前小组坚固力量重要战略决策,当使他们避免所有消极结果时的充分的费用.