The effect of concession period design on completion risk ma

The effect of concession period design on completion risk management of BOT projects
The design of concession period for build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects is crucial to financial viability and completion risk management.A systematic analysis shows that concession period design involves the design of concession period structure,the determination of the concession period length and incentive schemes.The concession period may have a single-period structure or a two-period structure,its length may be fixed or variable,and it may be combined with incentive schemes.Different designs reflect different risk control strategies for completion time overruns.The single-period concession structure requires the project company to assume completion risk,while the two-period concession structure could,to some extent,reduce the completion risk exposure to the project company,depending on the incentive schemes.Through Monte Carlo simulation,this paper evaluates the mean net present value (NPV),variance and NPV-at-risk of different concession period structures so tliat both the government and the concessionaires can understand their risk exposure and rewards.The paper then analyses the influence of project characteristics on concession period design to evaluate the feasibility of the design.It is concluded that a well-designed concession period structure can create a 'win-win' solution for both project promoter and the host government.
Keywords:Concession period structure,completion risk management,simulation
incentive scheme,privately financed infrastructure,BOT,
Introduction
Over the past two decades,a great number of infrastructure projects have been developed under concession contracts.According to the ninth annual survey
conducted by Public Works Financing (2000),over 1370 infrastructure concessions,with estimated capital costs of over $US575 billion,have been proposed,awarded
or completed under various forms of public-private parmership in over 100 countries around the world since 1985.At the same time,a considerable number of studies
on privately financed infrastructure projects have been presented in seminars,conferences and journals,which cover a wide range of topics from project evaluation,risk management and concession design to regulation.Among them,concession period design is an interesting topic of concern to both the public and private sectors,and closely related to project participants' financial returns and completion risk management.This paper systematically explores the types of concession
structures for BOT projects (build-operate-transfer - a
type of privately financed infrastructure project) and evaluates the effectiveness of different concession period structures on financial return and completion risk management through mathematical analyses and computer simulations.

在特许期内建造,营运及移交（BOT）项目的设计是至关重要的财务可行性和完成风险管理.一个系统的分析表明,特许经营期设计涉及特许权期限结构设计,特许权期限的决心和奖励计划.特许权期限可能有一个周期结构或两期的结构,其长度可以是固定或变量,它可能与激励机制相结合.不同的设计反映了不同的完成时间超支的风险控制策略.单期优惠结构要求的项目公司承担完成的风险,而两期优惠结构要求的项目公司承担完成的风险,而两期优惠结构可能在一定程度上降低风险的完成向项目公司,在奖励计划而定.通过蒙特卡罗模拟,本文计算的平均净现值（净现值）,方差和NPV -在-特许权期限结构不同的风险,因此tliat无论是政府特许公司能够理解他们的风险和回报.本文进而分析了在特许期内项目的特点设计的影响,以评估设计的可行性.它的结论是一个精心设计的特许权期限结构可以创造一个'双赢'两个项目的发起人和东道国政府的解决方案.
关键词：特许期结构,完成风险管理,仿真奖励计划,私人融资基础设施,BOT方式,引导
在过去的二十年,大量的基础设施项目已经制定下特许权合同.根据第九届年度调查公共工程经费的筹措（2000年）,基础设施特许权进行了超过1370美元以上US575与亿元资本成本,已经提出,授予或在公共和私营部门在全球100多个世界各国自1985年以来的各种形式完成.与此同时,相当数量的研究
关于私人融资基础设施项目已提交的研讨会,会议和期刊,内容涵盖了从项目评估,风险管理和监管的让步设计题材广泛.其中,特许期设计是一种关注的公共和私营部门的有趣的话题,并密切相关的项目参与者的财务回报和完工风险管理.这本文系统探讨了特许权的类型为（建造,营运及转移 - 私人融资基础设施项目类型）BOT项目的结构,并评估不同减让对财务回报,并通过数学分析和计算机模拟完成风险管理周期结构的有效性.